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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
A jury convicted Ronald Wisdom of three counts of !ewd conduct with a minor
under sixteen, allegedly committed against his step-daughter, M.L. Mr. Wisdom asserts
that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the State to present evidence that
he made an ambiguous comment about having secrets prior to being accused of having
committed any crime. Additionally, Mr. Wisdom asserts that the prosecutor committed
misconduct by effectively misstating the reasonable doubt standard and lowering the
State's burden of proof, and by appealing to the passions and prejudices of the jurors
when seeking a conviction.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
A grand jury indicted Ronald Wisdom on three counts of lewd conduct with a
minor under sixteen, with each count naming M.L. as the victim and identifying distinct
time-periods in which the conduct allegedly occurred. 1 (R., pp.8-10.) The State later
filed an Information Part II alleging that Mr. Wisdom was a persistent violator, having
two prior felony convictions. (R., pp.58-59.) The case proceeded to trial.
The prosecution's first witness was 20-year old Kayla Russell, Mr. Wisdom's
brother-in-law's fiancee. (Tr. Trial, p.139, L.7 - p.140, L.4.)2 Between January and May
of 2013, Ms. Russell spent a large amount of time at the Wisdom's house in Kuna
visiting her fiance, Austin Moore. (Tr. Trial, p.140, L.7 - p.142, L.18.) There were as

The time periods alleged in the Indictment corresponded with the time periods the
Wisdom family, including M.L., lived in three different houses in Ada County. See
~enerally Transcript of Grand Jury testimony.
Multiple transcripts were created for this appeal. References to the 630-page
transcript memorializing the bulk of the in-court proceedings will include the designation
"Tr. Trial."
1

1

many as 7 adults and 5 children (including M.L.) living in the house during that time, and
the atmosphere was "hectic." (Tr. Trial, p.142, L.19 - p.143, L.24; p.161, L:15 - p.164,
L.16.) M.L., who was 14 at the time, would argue with her parents and her four younger
siblings, and would frequently run off to the Zone, a place for minors associated with a
local church, or M.L. would just sit under a table a cry. (Tr. Trial, p.142, L.19 - p.143,
L.5; p.164, L.22 - p.172, L.16.) Ms. Russell testified that she had developed a bond
with M.L., who would tell Ms. Russell about the things going on in her life. (Tr. Trial,
p.144, L.5 - p.145, L.8.)
Outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor proffered testimony from
Ms. Russell that, one day while a group of people were in the garage smoking
cigarettes and "talking kind of about secrets and about things that we've done in the
past," Mr. Wisdom stated, "'I have secrets that no one knows about, and I don't have to
answer to anyone about them, not even God."' (Tr. Trial, p.150, L.3 - p.151, L.21.) The
prosecutor asserted that the statement was relevant because "most of the people if not
all the people in that garage were well aware of his prior conviction out of Twin Falls 3
and his drug history, et cetera" and, thus, the secret he referred to must be sexually
abusing M.L.. (Tr. Trial, p.151, L.16 - p.152, L.13; p.154, Ls.8-21.) Defense counsel
objected arguing that the comment was ambiguous and does not refer to the allegations
in the present case, has minimal probative value, and is substantially prejudicial.
(Tr. Trial, p.152, L.15 - p.154, L.1.) The district court found that Mr. Wisdom's comment

3

In 2009, Mr. Wisdom pied guilty to one count of felony injury to a child, after originally
being charged with 5 counts of lewd conduction with a minor, in Twin Falls County.
(PSI, pp.9, 11.) Mr. Wisdom's plea was based upon his admission that he had abused
drugs and exposed his prior step-children to that environment. (Tr. Trial, p.617, L.10 p.618, L.5.)

2

was admissible as a statement against interest pursuant to LR.E. 801 (d)(2), was
relevant, and was not more prejudicial than probative. (Tr. Trial, p.155, Ls.2-21.)
When the jury returned, Ms. Russell testified about the conversation in the
garage telling the jury that Mr. Wisdom said, '"I have secrets and things that I have done
that I don't have to answer to nobody for, not even you, not even God."'

(Tr. Trial,

p.156, Ls.3-16.) When Mr. Wisdom's wife, Christina Wisdom, asked him what he was
talking about, Mr. Wisdom "didn't really say anything." (Tr. Trial, p.156, Ls.17-22.)
A couple of days later, while Ms. Russell and Mr. Moore were visiting with some
of the residents of the Wisdom house, M.L. arrived home from school and told Ms.
Russell that Mr. Wisdom had "touched" and "done things" to her. (Tr. Trial, p.156, L.23
- p.157, L.25; p.159, Ls.22-24.) When Ms. Russell went to tell Mr. Moore what had
occurred, M.L. ran off with her friends. (Tr. Trial, p.158, L.1 - p.159, L.10.)
Mr. Wisdom's 26-year old son, Luccas McNeil!, was one of the people living at
the Wisdom residence during 2013. 4 (Tr. Trial, p.186, Ls.1-15; p.189, L.10- p.190, L.2;
p.202, Ls.13-14.)

He described the house as almost always unlocked, with a lot of

people living there and a lot of others who would just walk in the front door without
knocking when they would come for a visit, and he could not recall a time when he was
alone in the house. (Tr. Trial, p.204, L.4- p.207, L.16; p.218, L.8- p.222, L.10; p.224,
L.23 - p.224, L.10.)

Mr. McNeil! observed that M.L. was becoming more and more

unruly as she grew older, would get in more arguments with her parents and siblings,
and would just run away in defiance when she did not like the responses she was
getting from her parents. (Tr. Trial, p.210, L.21 - p.212, L.18.) Mr. McNeil! described

4

Mr. McNeil! was placed up for adoption when he was 16 months old, and did not reconnect with Mr. Wisdom until 2009. (Tr. Trial, p.186, L.16 - p.187, L.4; see also PSI,
p.16.)
3

Mr. Wisdom as the main disciplinarian, and the children would take advantage of
Ms. Wisdom when he was not there. (Tr. Trial, p.212, L.19 - p.214, L.5.) During the
few weeks prior to making her allegations, M.L. had an on-going dispute with her
parents over their refusal to get her a cell phone. (Tr. Trial, p.214, L.6 - p.215, L.4.)
When Mr. McNeil! arrived home one day in early May of 2013, 5 he heard a lot of
screaming and things flying around the house and crashing; when he walked into the
house, he saw Christina Wisdom "in an outrage" and throwing things around. (Tr. Trial,
p.196, L.19 - p.198, L.10.) Ms. Wisdom calmed down, packed some things into her
minivan, drove to the Zone to find M.L., and Mr. McNeil! followed her there. (Tr. Trial,
p.198, L.24 - p.199, L.20.) Mr. McNeil! described M.L. as being "upset" when he saw
her later in the day, and Ms. Wisdom asked him to call the police. (Tr. Trial, p.200, L.3
- p.202, L.2.) During all of the time he lived in the house, Mr. McNeil! never saw or
heard M.L. express any concern about being alone in the house with Mr. Wisdom. 6
(Tr. Trial, p.222, Ls.11-14.)
Christina Wisdom testified that she and Ron had been married for 9 years.
(Tr. Trial, p.238, Ls.1-16.)

She had 4 children from a previous marriage to Wayne

LeFler - 15 year-old M.L. and her brothers aged 14, 12, and 11 - and she and
Mr. Wisdom have an 8 year-old daughter together. (Tr. Trial, p.238, L.19 - p.239, L.21.)
She described Mr. Wisdom as treating all of her biological children as his own, and she

5

Defense counsel referred to May 9, 2013, as the date M.L. made her allegations to
Ms. Russell; however, it appears that the allegations were actually made the day before.
iSee Tr. Trial, p.215, Ls.14-25; p.229, L.3- p.230, L.7.)
Lucy McNeil!, who was adopted by the same family that adopted Luccas, testified that
she also lived with the Wisdoms during this period of time growing very close to the
family, and her description of the household, family dynamics, and the day M. L. made
the allegations were substantially consistent with Mr. McNeill's description. (See
Tr. Trial, p.512, L.1 - p.555, L.16.)
4

did not notice Mr. Wisdom being overly affectionate towards M.L. (Tr. Trial, p.382, L.13
-- p.383, L.11.) Ms. Wisdom had a difficult pregnancy with M.L., who has learning and
speech disabilities, and whose "comprehension is pretty low." (Tr. Trial, p.297, L.7 p.298, L.14.) Ms. Wisdom described living in three different houses from when M.L.
was in kindergarten to the present time. (Tr. Trial, p.247, L.21 - p.255, L. 12; see also
Ex.1.) Ms. Wisdom described the layout of the three houses and the large number of
people, both adult and children, who lived in the houses at various times, including
Mr. VVisdom's mother who suffered from multiple physical ailments and had limited
mobility. (Tr. Trial, p.255, L.13 - p.278, L.8.)
A year or two prior to making her allegations, M.L. stayed with her biological
father in Arizona for about one month and, when she returned, she was angry and
began acting out. (Tr. Trial, p.380, Ls.3-19.) Sometime between March and May of
2013, M.L. started getting very angry and irritable towards her parents, and she started
insisting that they get her a cell phone. (Tr. Trial, p.299, L.13 - p.300, L.7.) M.L. would
frequently yell at her mother and would take off running to friends' houses, or
occasionally just crawl under the table. (Tr. Trial, p.300, Ls.8-16; p.385, Ls.12-16.)
On the morning of May 8, 2013, Ms. Wisdom told M.L. that she needed to clean
her room but M.L. refused to do so. (Tr. Trial, p.303, Ls.5-23.) When Ms. Wisdom told
M.L. that her room would be stripped bare if M.L. did not clean it, M.L. got very angry
and told both Mr. and Ms. Wisdom that she hated them. (Tr. Trial, p.303, L.24 - p.304,
L.6.) When Ms. Wisdom arrived home that day (about 10 minutes after M.L. arrived
home from school), Kayla Russell relayed M.L.'s allegations and Ms. Wisdom started
"freaking out."

(Tr. Trial, p.304, L.7 - p.305, L.24.) After M.L. ran off to the Zone,

Ms. Wisdom and her sister-in-law, Giselle, drove to the Zone, retrieved her, and
5

Ms. Wisdom and all of her children went to stay at her father's house, where she met
with the police. (Tr. Trial, p.305, L.25 - p.310, L.5.) The next day, Ms. Wisdom took
M.L. to CARES to be interviewed and to have a physical examination conducted;
however, M.L. was resistant and did not want to get out of the car, and she refused a
physical examination. (Tr. Trial, p.395, L.24 - p.396, L.16.)
Over the next 5 months, Mr. Wisdom lived mostly with friends in the
neighborhood, although he did move back into the house for about a week and a half
when a detective told Ms. Wisdom that they could not build a case. (Tr. Trial, p.316, L.9
- p.325, L.17.) Jennifer Ash testified that Mr. Wisdom stayed with her and her husband
for a while, prior to charges being filed. (Tr. Trial, p.556, L.4 - p.565, L.14.) Ms. Ash
testified that on one occasion, she saw M.L. come up to Mr. Wisdom and say, "'Hi,
Daddy. I miss you."' (Tr. Trial, p.566, L.14 - p.567, L.8.) Another neighbor, Chuck Fox,
testified that on one occasion all of the children in the neighborhood were playing in a
bounce house, when M.L. and a friend came up to he and Mr. Wisdom, and M.L. and
Mr. Wisdom had what Mr. Fox described as a "normal daughter/stepfather kind of
encounter." (Tr. Trial, p.580, L.1 - p.589, L.5.)
Not long after M.L. made her allegations, Ms. Wisdom placed M.L. in
lntermountain Hospital,7 as her angry episodes became more frequent and more
violent. (Tr. Trial, p.325, L.18 - p.327, L.9.) M.L. returned home after an 11-day stay at
lntermountain and, although she was on medication, she began cutting herself.
(Tr. Trial, p.327, L.10 - p.328, L.3.)

Ms. Wisdom, who herself suffers from major

depression, anxiety, and borderline personality disorder, attempted to help M.L. deal
with her cutting problem, as she had "been a cutter" herself, but M.L.'s behavior

6

continued throughout the summer. (Tr. Trial, p.310, Ls.20-25; p.328, Ls.4-19.) At the
beginning of June, 2013, M.L. went to speak with a detective and made a "confront call"
to Mr. Wisdom using her mother's cell phone; Ms. Wisdom herself wore a wire on
another occasion attempting to get Mr. Wisdom to make incriminating statements.
(Tr. Trial, p.329, L.12 -p.332, L.2.) Mr. Wisdom made no incriminating statements. Id
Prior to M.L. testifying, a comfort dog named "Sunday" was brought into the
courtroom and sat near M.L.'s feet in the witness box, and the court read the jury an
instruction telling the jurors that "somewhat different procedures" are followed when a
"youthful witness" testifies so they won't be "intimidated by the courtroom atmosphere."
(R., pp.73-80, 114; Tr. Trial, p.461, L.12 - p.463, L.16.) Although it appears she was

initially hesitant to answer the prosecutor's question, 8 M.L. testified that when she was
in the third grade (the time period alleged in Court I), Mr. Wisdom touched her vagina
with his mouth, penis, and finger.

(Tr. Trial, p.469, L.7 - p.474, L.16.)

When it

appeared that M.L. was either unable or unwilling to answer the prosecutor's question
about what M.L. meant when she said Mr. Wisdom "fingered" her, the court held a
bench conference, and the prosecutor asked M.L. if it would be easier for her if the court
ordered her family members to leave, but M.L. declined.

(Tr. Trial, p.473, Ls.9-25.)

M.L. testified that Mr. Wisdom asked her if she would ever tell, and she promised him
that she would not. (Tr. Trial, p.472, Ls.21-24.) She testified that the same type of
conduct occurred "randomly" during the time periods alleged in Counts II and Ill of the

Ms. Wisdom described lntermountain as a "psychiatric mental hospital." {Tr. Trial,
r.404, Ls.20-23.)
After M.L. agreed that something happened between her and Mr. Wisdom that made
her feel uncomfortable, the prosecutor asked "What was it that happened? Would it be
easier to close your eyes, or are you thinking about what happened? [M.L.], are you
going to be able to talk to us and tell us what happened?" (Tr. Trial, p.469, Ls.7-16.)
7

7

Indictment. (Tr. Trial, p.474, L.17 ·- p.481, L.18.) M.L. testified that she told her mother
about the touching at some point prior to May of 2013, but the contact did not stop.
(Tr. Trial, p.478, Ls.7-13.)
M.L. testified that she decided to tell people what was happening after she heard
a person on the radio encourage people who were aware of abuse to tell someone; she
told her friends at school, and then told Kayla Russell when she got home from school.
(Tr. Trial, p.481, L.22 - p.484, L.1.) When she spoke with her mother a few minutes
later, Ms. Wisdom began "freaking out on everyone," and M.L. ran off to the Zone.
(Tr. Trial, p.484, L.2 - p.485, L.5.) M.L. did not talk to the police that night, and did not
participate in the physical examination the next day because she believed that it wou!d
be performed by a male doctor. (Tr. Trial, p.485, L.6 - p.487, L.21.) Ultimately, she
agreed to speak with the detective in charge of her case because her family members
and neighbors all thought that she was lying. (Tr. Trial, p.488, L.1

p.490, L.1.)

Mr. Wisdom was arrested on October 19, 2013; over 5 months after M.L. first
accused him of sexually abusing her. (Tr. Trial, p.333, Ls.19-23.)
During the State's closing argument, the prosecutor stated the following:
In order for you to acquit, to find him not guilty, you have to
disbelieve the State's witnesses and think that [M.L.] completely made this
up. You have to believe that she was so mad over not getting a cell
phone or being able to hang out with her friends or have a messy room
that this 14-year old made this all up.
(Tr. Closing, p.66, Ls.11-17.)9

During the State's rebuttal argument, the prosecutor

argued,

Two separate transcripts were created for Day 3 of the jury trial occurring on
February 28, 2014; one containing the remaining witness testimony, reading of the final
jury instructions, and closing arguments, and the other containing the reading of the
verdict and Mr. Wisdom's admission to being a persistent violator. For ease of
reference, the transcript containing the closing arguments will be cited as "Tr. Closing,"
9

8

The jury instruction says you cannot base your decision on
sympathy or prejudice. But that doesn't mean that you totally put all of
your emotions aside and have to stand back and assess the evidence as
though you are an automaton. If you reacted to how [M.L.] was testifying
because you felt bad for her and you felt like she was being pressed to
talk about stuff that was very difficult to talk about, then you believe her.
And believing her is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed
these crimes.
(Tr. Closing, p.99, Ls.3-13.) No objection was raised to either of these arguments.
The jury found Mr. Wisdom guilty of all charges and Mr. Wisdom admitted to
being a persistent violator.

(R., pp.148-149; Tr. EOP.) The district court sentenced

Mr. Wisdom on each count to concurrent unified terms of 40 years, with 20 years fixed.
(R., pp.157-161.) Mr. Wisdom filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.164-166.)

and the transcript containing Mr. Wisdom's admission to being a persistent violator will
be cited as "Tr. EOP."

9

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by allowing the State to present
evidence that Mr. Wisdom made a comment about having secrets and having
done things that no one can judge him for?

2.

Did the prosecutor commit misconduct by misstating the State's burden of proof
and by appealing to the passions and prejudices of the jurors?

10

ARGUMENT

L
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Allowing The State To Present Evidence
That Mr. VVisdom Made A Comment About Having Secrets And Having Done Things
That No One Can Judge Him For
A

Introduction

Mr. Wisdom asserts that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the
State to present evidence that he said, '"I have secrets and things that I have done that I
don't have to answer to nobody for, not even you, not even God."' (Tr. Trial, ,p.156,
Ls.3-16.) Mr. Wisdom asserts that the State failed to demonstrate that his comment
was related to the charged conduct and, therefore, the State failed to show the
comment was relevant. Alternatively, even if there is some relevance to Mr. Wisdom's
comment, the limited probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
Mr. Wisdom further asserts that the State will be unable to prove the district court's
erroneous admission of the evidence is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Evidence That Mr. Wisdom
Made A Comment About Having Done Things That No One Can Judge Him For
Idaho appellate courts apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a

lower court's decision to either admit or exclude evidence. State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho
584, 590 (2013) (quoting White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 888 (2004).) "'A trial court
does not abuse its discretion if it (1) recognizes the issue as one of discretion, (2) acts
within the boundaries of its discretion and applies the applicable legal standards, and
(3) reaches the decision through an exercise of reason."' Id. (quoting Fazzio v. Mason,
150 Idaho 591, 594 (2011 ).)

11

1.

Mr. Wisdom's Comment Was Not Relevant And, Therefore, Was Not
Admissible

Relevant evidence is admissible unless otherwise prohibited by the Rules of
Evidence, while evidence that is not relevant is not admissible. I.RE. 402. Evidence is
relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence. I.RE. 401. Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law that
is freely reviewed. State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 228 (2008). When determining
whether proffered evidence is relevant, an appellate Court looks to the legal theories
presented by the parties. State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 582, 592 (2010).
The district court found the proffered evidence to be relevant without providing
any insight into how the court reached its conclusion. (Tr. Trial, p.155, Ls.6-12) The
district court's conclusion was erroneous. The prosecutor asserted that Mr. Wisdom's
comment was relevant because "most of the people if not all the people in that garage
were well aware of his prior conviction out of Twin Falls and his drug history, et cetera"
and, thus, he could only be referring "to this conduct here." (Tr. Trial, p.151, L.16 p.152, L.13; p.154, Ls.8-21.) This argument is without merit for multiple reasons.
First, the prosecutor's argument is based upon the unsubstantiated premise that
Mr. Wisdom has only done three things in his life that would meet the criteria, in his
mind, of being "secrets and things that I have done that I don't have to answer to
nobody for, not even you, not even God." The fact that the prosecutor may believe
Mr. Wisdom could only have three possible "secrets" simply does not make it true.
Neither the rules of evidence, nor basic logic, support the prosecutor's relevance
argument.

12

Second, even if one accepts the basic premise that Mr. Wisdom's comment
could not have referred to either his prior criminal history or his prior drug use because
the others in the garage already knew about it, a premise that is not itself substantiated
by the evidence, 10 there is still nothing to support the conclusion that Mr. Wisdom was
referring to sexually abusing M.L. Ms. Russell testified that the people in the garage
"were all talking kind of about secrets and about things that we've done in the past and
kind of things that we wish we could change and things that we wished we hadn't done."
(Tr. Trial, p.150, Ls.15-18.)

Mr. Wisdom had neither been informally accused nor

formally charged with having sexually abused M.L. when he made the comment in the
garage. Had Mr. Wisdom's comment been made in the context of someone confronting
him with an allegation that he sexually abused M.L., his comment would likely be
admissible.
However, in the context of how it was actually made with no allegation or even a
suggestion that Mr. Wisdom had sexually abused, M.L., Mr. Wisdom's comment can
only be viewed as an admission to sexually abusing M.L., if one first assumes that
Mr. Wisdom sexually abused M.L.

By the prosecutor's "bootstrapping" logic, if one

assumes that Mr. Wisdom robbed a bank, his comments would be admissible to prove
he robbed a bank. Furthermore, the prosecutor's legal construct would work for any
charge.

If, for example, Mr. Wisdom had been charged with murder, Mr. Wisdom's

comment would be relevant to show he committed murder because, after all, the other

10

Ms. Russell testified that the people in the garage included her, Mr. Wisdom,
Ms. Wisdom, Luccas McNeil!, Lucy McNeil!, and one or two of the kids, including
possibly M.L. (Tr. Trial, p.150, Ls.3-12.) The State presented no evidence supporting
their claim that "most of the people if not all the people in that garage were well aware of
his prior conviction out of Twin Falls and his drug history, et cetera."(See generally
Tr.Trial.)
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people in the garage already knew about his prior criminal and drug history; thus, he
could have only been talking about unlawfully killing another human being with malice
aforethought. The State's argument, and the presumed reason the district court allowed
Mr. Wisdom's comment into evidence, does not stand up to either logical or legal
scrutiny.
In sum, the fact that Mr. Wisdom said "I have secrets and things that I have done

that I don't have to answer to nobody for, not even you, not even God," does not make it
more or less likely that Mr. Wisdom committed lewd conduct against M.L. Therefore,
the comment was not relevant and not admissible.

2.

Any Limited Relevance Of Mr. Wisdom's Comment Was Substantially
Outwei hed B Its Pre·udicial Effect

Even if there is some limited relevance to Mr. Wisdom's comment, the relevance
was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. "Although relevant, evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."

I.R.E. 403.

When reviewing the determination that the probative value of the evidence is not
outweighed by unfair prejudice, the abuse of discretion standard is applied. State v.

Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816 (Ct. App. 1993).
The district court recognized the application of I.R.E. 403 and stated, without
analysis, "I don't think it should be kept out on those bases." (Tr. Trial, p.155, Ls.13-21.)

The district court abused its discretion. As noted above, Mr. Wisdom never admitted to
sexually abusing M.L.

There is nothing in the context of making the comment that
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suggests that Mr. Wisdom was even aware of allegations that he sexually abused M.L.,
let alone that this alleged abuse was the secret he was keeping.
Even if there was some limited relevance, the fact that Mr. Wisdom's comment
was non-specific, makes it substantially more likely that the jurors took the comment as
an admission by Mr. Wisdom that he was a person of bad character.

Evidence of a

person's poor character is not admissible to prove the person acted in conformity
therewith.

I.RE. 404. "This exclusion is based upon the theory that such evidence

induces the jury to believe the accused is more likely to have committed the charged
crime because he or she is a person of bad character." State v. Shepherd, 124 Idaho
54, 57 (Ct. App. 1993).
In the present case, there is a substantial danger that the jury hearing
Mr. Wisdom admit that he has secrets and has done things that no one, not even God,
could judge him for, would find him guilty of the charged offense based not upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the crimes, but rather based upon a
finding that he is a person who has done some things that are really bad and he needs
to be punished for them. As such, even if there was some relevance, the district court
abused its discretion by failing to exclude Mr. Wisdom's comments as their probative
value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

C.

The State Will Be Unable To Prove The Error Is Harmless Beyond A Reasonable
Doubt
Where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous objection and the

appellant shows that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the
United States Supreme Court in Chapman. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227
15

(2010). 'To hold an error as harmless, an appellate court must declare a belief, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that such evidence
complained of contributed to the conviction." State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980)
(citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).

For the reasons more fully

articulated in section 1(8)(2) of this brief above and section 11(8)(3) of this brief below,
the State will be unable to prove the error in admitting Mr. Wisdom's comment harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
11.
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct B if Misstating The State's Burden Of Proof And
B A ealin To The Passions And Pre"udices Of The Jurors

A

Introduction
The prosecutor committed misconduct during closing arguments both by

misstating the State's burden of proof and by appealing to the passions and prejudices
of the jurors. Although Mr. Wisdom did not object to the prosecutor's arguments, he
asserts that the misconduct violated his right to due process, was plain on the face of
the record, and the misconduct was not harmless.

B.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct During The State's Closing Arguments
Amounting To Fundamental Error, Requiring This Court To Vacate Mr. Wisdom's
Conviction
"Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law

as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts a defendant's
Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010).
"Where prosecutorial misconduct was not objected to at trial, Idaho appellate courts
may only order a reversal when the defendant demonstrates that the violation in
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question qualifies as fundamental error[.]"

Id.

"Such review includes a three-prong

inquiry wherein the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that
the alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional
rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a
tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." Id. at 228.

1.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By Effectively Misstating The
Reasonable Doubt Standard And Lowering The State's Burden Of Proof,
And By Appealing To The Passions And Prejudices Of The Jury, All Of
Which Deprived Mr. Wisdom His Right To A Fair Trial

During the State's closing argument, the prosecutor stated the following:

In order for you to acquit, to find him not guilty, you have to
disbelieve the State's witnesses and think that [M.L.] completely
made this up. You have to believe that she was so mad over not getting
a cell phone or being able to hang out with her friends or have a messy
room that this 14-year old made this all up.
(Tr. Closing, p.66, Ls.11-17 (emphasis added).)

The prosecutor's argument is a

misstatement of the reasonable doubt standard and effectively lowers the State's
burden of proof. A prosecutor commits misconduct during closing arguments by
misstating the law and lowering the State's burden of proof. State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho
82, 86-86 (Ct, App. 2007) (citing State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 769 (1992);

State v. Love/ass, 133 Idaho 160, 168 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Missamore, 114 Idaho
879, 882 (Ct. App. 1988).)
The jurors did not need to disbelieve the State's witnesses or believe that M.L.
made up the allegations in order to find Mr. Wisdom not guilty. 11

On the contrary, the

jurors merely needed to have a reasonable doubt as to whether M.L.'s allegations were
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true. If the jurors were unsure whether or not M.L. was telling the truth, the State would
have failed to prove Mr. Wisdom was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The

prosecutor, however, told the jurors that they could not acquit Mr. Wisdom unless they
first concluded that M.L. "made this all up." A criminal defendant does not have the
burden of proving the complaining witness made up the allegations; the State must
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the charged crimes.
The prosecutor committed misconduct by making this false argument.
The prosecutor's misconduct continued during the State's rebuttal argument,
The jury instruction says you cannot base your decision on
sympathy or prejudice. 12 But that doesn't mean that you totally put all of
your emotions aside and have to stand back and assess the evidence as
though you are an automaton. If you reacted to how [M.L.] was
testifying because you felt bad for her and you felt like she was
being pressed to talk about stuff that was very difficult to talk about,
then you believe her. And believing her is proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that he committed these crimes.
(Tr. Closing, p.99, Ls.3-13 (emphasis added).) After first telling the jury that they could
not base their decision on sympathy or prejudice, the prosecutor encouraged the jury to
base their decision on sympathy and prejudice.

"[A]ppeals to emotion, passion or

prejudice of the jury through use of inflammatory tactics are impermissible." Phillips,
144 Idaho at 87 (citing Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho at 769; State v. Smith, 117 Idaho 891,
898 (1990); State v. LaMere, 103 Idaho 839, 844 (1982); State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho
163, 168 (1980)).

The prosecutor argued to the jury that, if they felt bad for M.L. and felt like she
was being "pressed to talk about" the very allegations upon which Mr. Wisdom was
standing trial, then they believed M.L. and must find Mr. Wisdom guilty beyond a

The only witness the State called who testified that Mr. Wisdom committed lewd
conduct was M .L.
11
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reasonable doubt.

Defendants have a due process right to impartial jurors who will

determine whether the State proved the charged conduct beyond a reasonable doubt
based upon the evidence presented, not based upon whether they felt bad for the
complaining witness.

The prosecutor committed misconduct in presenting this false

argument.

2.

The Prosecutorial Misconduct Is Plain On Its Face

The prosecutorial misconduct in this case is plain on its face, and there is no
reason to believe that Mr. Wisdom's counsel was "sandbagging" the district court by
failing to object to the prosecutor lowering the State's burden of proof by falsely telling
the jurors that unless they disbelieve M.L., they must find Mr. Wisdom guilty. There is
also no reason to believe that Ms. Wisdom's counsel was "sandbagging" the district
court by failing to object to the prosecutor's appeal to the passions and prejudices of the
jury in arguing that any sympathy they felt for M.L. meant they believed her testimony,
and was proof beyond a reasonable doubt. There is simply no strategic advantage that
can possibly be gained by failing to object to, and to ask the court to correct, the
prosecutor's misstatement of the law and appeal to the passions and prejudices of the
jurors.

Therefore, the prosecutorial misconduct is plain on its face.

3.

The Prosecutorial Misconduct Is Not Harmless

Because Mr. Wisdom did not object to the prosecutorial misconduct during trial,
he bears "the burden of proving there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected
the outcome of the trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. Mr. Wisdom asserts that there is a
reasonable possibility that the prosecutorial misconduct affected the outcome of his trial.

12

See Jury Instruction 1 (R., p.127).

19

The prosecutor's evidence was far from overwhelming. M.L.'s description of the
alleged sexual abuse was light on details. (See generally Tr. Trial, p.464, L.1 - p.506,
L.20 (M.L.'s testimony).) Although M.L. claimed that the abuse only occurred in the
various houses that she and her family lived in, various witnesses testified that many
people lived in the houses at various times and many visitors entered the house without
knocking, and none of the witnesses (other than M.L.) testified that they had ever seen
any inappropriate interactions between Mr. Wisdom and M.L. (See generally, Tr. Trial.)
There were plenty of reasons for the jury to have questioned M.L.'s believability.
M.L. was apparently hesitant to testify. (Tr. Trial, p.469, L.7 - p.473, L.25.) The jury
heard evidence that M.L. fought constantly with ~Ar. Wisdom and others and would
throw what could rightfully be described as temper-tantrums when she did not get her
way. (Tr. Trial, p.210, L.21 -p.212, L.18; p.300, Ls.8-16; p.385, Ls.12-16; p.523, L.11 -

p.524, L.6.) M.L. was initially uncooperative in the investigation, was hospitalized in a
mental health facility, and began cutting herself after being released from the hospital.
(Tr. Trial, p.395, L.24 - p.396, L.16; p.485, L.6 - p.490, L.1.)
The prosecutor's misconduct was a targeted attempt at mitigating the
shortcomings in the State's case.

By telling the jurors that they had to completely

disbelieve M.L.'s claims, rather than have a reasonable doubt as to their validity, in
order to find Mr. Wisdom not guilty, the prosecutor gave the jurors permission to find
Mr. Wisdom guilty even if they actually had a reasonable doubt about whether M.L.'s
story was believable. By telling the jurors that their own emotional reaction to M.L.'s
testimony is proof that she was telling the truth, the prosecutor gave the jurors
permission to make their decision based upon their visceral reaction to watching M.L.
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give her story, rather than the much more onerous task of determining whether or not
M.L.'s story was true.
Mr. Wisdom asserts that there is a reasonable possibility that the prosecutor's
misconduct affected the outcome of the trial, and the error is not harmless. See Perry,
150 Idaho at 226.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Wisdom respectfully requests that this Court vacate his convictions and
remand his case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 24 th day of March, 2015.

qeputy State Appellate Public Defender
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